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INTRODUCTION 
When Justice John Paul Stevens announced his retirement from the 
Supreme Court in April 2010, the news was accompanied by the inevitable 
counting of votes on the Supreme Court.  The conventional wisdom was 
that Stevens’s retirement meant the departure of the most senior liberal 
Justice from the Court and that his successor would not substantially 
change the political orientation of the conservative Court led by Chief 
Justice John Roberts.  The focus on the political implications of Stevens’s 
retirement obscured a significant aspect of his retirement: the loss of the 
Supreme Court’s preeminent common law lawyer.  
From his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1975 through his last 
term that ended in 2010, Justice Stevens generally decided cases in the 
manner of the quintessential common law judge.  This common law 
approach was defined by three related qualities.  First, Stevens decided 
cases narrowly, with careful attention to the facts of the particular case and 
primary attention paid to the contentions of the litigants.  This approach 
was consistent with the common law notion that the law develops on a 
case-by-case basis over time.  Second, although Stevens did not shy away 
from exercising judicial power, he nevertheless employed it in moderation, 
often deferring to other legal decision-makers.  Third, he generally 
eschewed the political debates that often are attendant to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions involving issues of constitutional interpretation.1  
Stevens’s common law approach to deciding cases certainly characterized 
his personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. 
In recent years, as the prospect of Justice Stevens’s retirement loomed, 
his decisions became the subject of substantial academic inquiry.2  
 
 1. No other current Justice on the Supreme Court follows Justice Stevens’s common 
law approach to deciding cases.  On the right, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas 
are devout Originalists, committed to deciding cases in accordance with their views of what 
the framers of the Constitution intended.  Chief Justice Roberts—usually joined by Justice 
Samuel Alito—tends to be an ideological conservative.  Justice Anthony Kennedy often 
decides cases in sweeping terms, even when the result is liberal.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating criminal laws outlawing homosexuality).  On 
the left, the distinctions are not as clear but are nevertheless evident.  Justice Stephen Breyer 
often shares Stevens’s views but is willing to go one step further and decide the case in 
accordance with his views of the appropriate policy.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg shares 
Stevens’s attention to detail and nuance but tends to be more constrained about the exercise 
of judicial power.  As for Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, it is too early to tell. 
 2. The most prominent example is the Fordham Law Review symposium on Justice 
Stevens.  See Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1557 
(2006); see also Jeff Bleich et al., Justice John Paul Stevens: A Maverick, Liberal, 
Libertarian, Conservative Statesman on the Court, 67 OR. ST. B. BULL. 26, 27 (Oct. 2007) 
(noting that “Justice Stevens’[s] approach to decision-making . . . is not ‘liberal’ so much as 
it is merely less conservative than that of President Bush’s recent appointments” and that 
“[w]hatever the label, his brand of analysis is independent”); Christopher E. Smith, Justice 
John Paul Stevens and Prisoners’ Rights, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 83, 106 (2007) 
(arguing that Justice Stevens was “the contemporary Supreme Court’s foremost advocate of 
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Nevertheless, apparently no one has specifically examined the 
jurisprudence of Stevens’s personal jurisdiction decisions.3  This oversight 
may be due to the fact that the Supreme Court failed more than it 
succeeded in its effort to develop a coherent body of law with respect to 
personal jurisdiction in the series of cases that began with Shaffer v. 
Heitner in 1977 and concluded with Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute in 
1991.4  After Carnival Cruise, the Supreme Court abandoned its efforts to 
provide a general set of personal jurisdiction rules and did not squarely 
address the rules governing personal jurisdiction for two decades.5  
Furthermore, the role of Justice Stevens in this set of cases was not that of 
leader or decision-maker but rather that of critic, in both dissents and 
concurring opinions. 
From the perspective of a legal scholar, the decisions of a single 
Justice criticizing a now-settled, albeit less-than-coherent, body of law may 
not have seemed worth exploring.  In fact, Justice Stevens’s personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence warrants examination for a number of reasons.  
As a doctrinal and pedagogical matter, personal jurisdiction is one of the 
most challenging legal issues first-year law students confront; this 
challenge results not only from the different parts of the analysis and the 
various categories of personal jurisdiction, but also from the failure of the 
Supreme Court to reach consensus on an analytical framework for 
 
constitutional rights protections for incarcerated, convicted offenders”); Douglas M. 
Branson, Prairie Populist? The Business and Securities Law Opinions of Justice John Paul 
Stevens, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 607 (1996) (Justice Stevens’s judicial decisions are 
characterized by “pragmatism, adherence to the principle of judicial restraint, an absence of 
litigation phobia, willingness to look beyond the plain meaning of a statute, and superb 
common law skills”); Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Paul Stevens and the Manners of 
Judging, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L., xxix, xxxii (“Justice Stevens respects the formal 
restrictions that flow from the judiciary’s institutional role.”); William D. Popkin, A 
Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 1087. 
 3. But see Stanley E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to be Done Insane!, 
58 TENN. L. REV. 497, 531–37 (1991) (discussing “Stevens’ [r]efusal to [a]dopt any 
[j]urisdictional [t]heory”); id. at 532 (“Essentially, Justice Stevens’ jurisdictional ‘theory’ 
consists of crafting fact-specific precedents based on consistency with earlier fact-specific 
precedents tempered by Justice Stevens’ subjective sense of fairness.”). 
 4. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 
U.S. 585 (1991).   
 5. In 2011, after Justice Stevens retired, the Court revisited the issue of personal 
jurisdiction in a pair of decisions.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. 
Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (North Carolina court could not exercise general jurisdiction over 
foreign subsidiaries of Ohio corporation); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 
2780, 2791 (2011) (New Jersey court could not exercise specific jurisdiction over English 
company that manufactured—but did not distribute on its own—machine that injured 
plaintiff in New Jersey).  This Article is not about Goodyear or J. McIntyre but nevertheless 
will discuss both decisions to the extent they are relevant to understanding Justice Stevens’s 
approach to personal jurisdiction.  As detailed infra, the decisions—especially the fractured 
decision in J. McIntyre—confirm a number of points established through an analysis of 
Justice Stevens’s decisions. 
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evaluating personal jurisdiction.  Stevens’s decisions highlight the limits of 
the Supreme Court’s efforts and provide insight into the various rules 
articulated in the Court’s decisions.  As a jurisprudential matter, Stevens’s 
common law approach contrasts with that of other Justices, illuminating the 
consequences of different judicial philosophies in a particular area of law.  
Finally, as an institutional matter, Stevens’s personal jurisdiction decisions, 
in particular his concurrences in Asahi and Burnham, demonstrate the way 
in which the Court’s institutional practices enabled him to limit the 
holdings in those cases—results entirely consistent with his common law 
approach. 
Part I of this Article provides a more detailed definition of the 
common law approach to judging and provides the doctrinal background 
necessary to understand that approach in the context of personal 
jurisdiction.  Part II examines the Supreme Court cases on personal 
jurisdiction, describing the Court’s decision and then Justice Stevens’s 
separate decision in the case.  The analysis starts with Shaffer and ends 
with Carnival Cruise.  Along the way, it notes the Supreme Court’s limited 
success in developing a general framework for evaluating the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in a civil case.  Finally, this Article concludes with 
thoughts on Stevens’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and what it may 
teach us, not only about civil procedure but also, more generally, about 
judicial decision-making. 
I. DEFINITIONS AND DOCTRINE: THE COMMON LAW APPROACH TO 
JUDGING AND BASIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE 
Personal jurisdiction, generally taught in the first-year Civil Procedure 
course, is a doctrine governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Fundamentally, the question before the court in a challenge 
to the forum state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is whether the 
assertion of jurisdiction would be fair to the defendant.6  Personal 
jurisdiction, therefore, is a constitutional law doctrine that implicates more 
general questions of constitutional interpretation. 
In cases involving constitutional interpretation, the description of 
Justice Stevens as a common law judge readily applies.  The common law 
 
 6. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires 
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  See also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 
131 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The modern approach to jurisdiction over 
corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime place to 
reason and fairness.”).  But see id. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (stating that “[f]reeform 
notions of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a 
judgment rendered in the absence of authority into law” and holding that purposeful 
availment is the determining factor with respect to personal jurisdiction in products liability 
cases). 
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judge tends to decide cases narrowly, with an emphasis on the particular 
facts of the case.  Professor William Popkin noted this aspect of Stevens’s 
approach to deciding cases in his observation that Stevens deliberated 
“about the facts of a particular case” and avoided “overly broad 
generalizations and summary dispositions.”7  Furthermore, Stevens’s 
commitment to “deliberation focused on the facts of a particular case,” and 
“narrowed the breadth of a judicial decision,” generally producing a 
decision that “pa[id] genuine heed to the litigants’ claims.”8 
Perhaps the most important characteristic of the common law 
approach is its reliance upon a process of case-by-case deliberation, in 
which the law develops through courts continuously deciding cases that 
present new facts and circumstances requiring the application of familiar 
legal principles and occasionally the development of new legal principles.9  
The common law process for the development of constitutional doctrine 
not only counsels against overbroad holdings in favor of more gradual 
development of the law, it also informed Justice Stevens’s reluctance to 
adjudicate constitutional issues when the case could have been decided on 
other grounds.10  Finally, as a common law judge, Stevens was particularly 
aware of the importance of the case to the individual litigants and believed 
that the judge’s primary obligation was to carefully consider the particular 
case before the court.11  This is most evident in his attention to the facts of 
the case, generally set out in detail and with care in his written decisions.12 
 
 7. Popkin, supra note 2, at 1090. 
 8. Id. at 1091. 
 9. Id. at 1094; see also John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 
JUDICATURE 177, 180 (1982) (“[O]ur common law heritage and the repeated need to add 
new stitches in the open fabric of our statutory and constitutional law foreclose the 
suggestion that judges never make law.”); see generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–8 (1949). 
 10. See Popkin, supra note 2, at 1096; Stevens, supra note 9 (citing Justice Brandeis’s 
concurrence in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341–56 (1936), to support 
his view that the doctrine of judicial restraint “teaches judges to avoid unnecessary 
lawmaking”). 
 11. Stevens, supra note 9, at 183.  At the close of his article, Justice Stevens quotes 
Justice Potter Stewart with approval:  
I think it’s very important for a judge—any judge, anywhere—to remember that 
every case is the most important case in the world for the people involved in that 
case, and not to think of a case as a second-class case or a third-class case or an 
unimportant case.  
Id.  As discussed in the Conclusion of this Article, not every justice shares this view of the 
Supreme Court’s priorities and institutional role.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law 
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 12. Popkin, supra note 2, at 1091.  In deciding cases narrowly, paying close attention 
to the facts, and emphasizing the importance of the case to the litigants, Justice Stevens also 
may be described as a minimalist judge.  The academic focus on minimalism grew out of 
continuing concerns with judicial activism and the political controversy—including 
specifically concerns about democratic self-government—attendant to broad or intrusive 
decisions by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About 
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Justice Stevens’s common law approach also was consistent with and 
reinforced his belief in judicial restraint, which he has defined as “a 
doctrine that relates to the merits of judicial decisions” and “that focuses on 
the process of making judicial decisions.  It is a doctrine that teaches judges 
to ask themselves whether, and if so when, they should decide the merits of 
questions that litigants press upon them.”13  Critically, Stevens’s 
understanding of judicial restraint focused on the institutional (rather than 
constitutional) limitations of courts; the issue was not whether the court has 
the power to decide the pending controversy but whether the court or 
another branch of government should do so—and if the court did decide the 
case, how broadly its decision should apply.14 
Finally, it is important to note that all of these different qualities—
Justice Stevens’s belief in judicial restraint, commitment to deciding cases 
narrowly with an emphasis on the facts of the case, primary concern for the 
litigants, and faith in the development of the law through the common law 
approach to deciding cases—were related to, and in fact reinforced by, each 
other.  A Supreme Court decision that is narrowly limited to its facts results 
in the articulation of a more specific rule.  Such a decision also allows for 
lawmakers, including courts, to modify or develop the rule depending on 
the facts and circumstances of the next case.  It also necessarily makes the 
litigants’ concerns and contentions—as opposed to the more general 
political or philosophical implications of the Court’s decision—the central 
focus of the case.15 
The next section of this Article, Part II, describes and discusses five 
personal jurisdiction cases in order to illustrate Justice Stevens’s common 
law approach to judging.  Before discussing the cases, it is necessary to 
provide a brief overview of personal jurisdiction doctrine.  Although, as 
 
Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 43 (2007); Cass Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1914–15 (2006); Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial 
Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1454 (2000).  The literature on judicial minimalism 
is less relevant here than in other contexts, such as litigation over abortion rights and 
affirmative action, because personal jurisdiction is not a politically-controversial area of the 
law.  Nevertheless, Justice Stevens’s common law approach was consistent with that of a 
judicial minimalist who, among other things, “favors rulings that are narrow rather than 
wide” and “seeks rulings that are shallow rather than deep.”  Sunstein, supra, at 1908.  It 
also was in accord with his belief in judicial restraint.  See infra text accompanying notes 
13–15. 
 13. Stevens, supra note 9; see also John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of 
Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 37 (1992) (“The doctrine of judicial restraint . . . imposes 
on federal judges the obligation to avoid unnecessary or unduly expansive constitutional 
adjudication.”); Popkin, supra note 2, at 1090 (describing Stevens’s philosophy of judicial 
restraint, which holds that the Supreme Court “should not decide cases that other institutions 
can decide at least as well or better”). 
 14. Popkin, supra note 2, at 1090. 
 15. See also id. at 1091 (noting that “[j]udicial deference to other institutions preserves 
the Court’s time and political capital to implement” the objective of “deliberation about the 
facts of a particular case”). 
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noted earlier, the resolution of a personal jurisdiction dispute involves the 
basic question of whether the forum state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 
is fair to the defendant, the doctrine that developed through the case law 
requires the consideration of a number of factors.  The first consideration is 
whether the dispute involves a question of specific jurisdiction or general 
jurisdiction.  Specific jurisdiction is based on limited activities or 
“minimum contacts” by a non-resident defendant in the forum state and 
limits the court’s jurisdiction to claims arising out of those contacts.16  
Where the non-resident defendant’s contacts in the forum state are more 
extensive, they may be so “continuous and systematic” as to subject the 
defendant to general jurisdiction, which means the defendant may be sued 
on any claim—including claims unrelated to the contacts.17 
In a case involving specific jurisdiction, the first question is whether 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by the forum state’s long-
arm statute.18  If so, the second question is whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause.  That question, in 
turn, depends on whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts 
with the forum state and also whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
is consistent with notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”  In a case 
involving the exercise of specific jurisdiction, the minimum contacts 
analysis requires consideration of three factors: the relationship between 
the defendant’s contacts and the claim, purposeful availment, and 
foreseeability.19  The fair play and substantial justice determination requires 
consideration of five factors: burden on the defendant, convenience of the 
plaintiff, the forum state’s interest in the case, the judicial system’s interest 
in efficient resolution of controversies, and social policy.20 
 Well before the Supreme Court decided the series of cases examined 
in this Article, Professor Geoffrey Hazard wrote a superb article arguing 
that under the prevailing case law, the determination of whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction in a particular case was constitutional 
amounted to an exercise in “arbitrary particularization.”21  Perhaps because 
of the uncertainty attendant to this state of the law, the Supreme Court 
attempted to develop a more uniform—and more specific—set of rules for 
personal jurisdiction doctrine.22  As detailed below, the Court’s efforts met 
 
 16. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011) (“Adjudicatory 
authority is ‘specific’ when the suit ‘aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum.’”) (internal citation omitted).  
 17. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317; see also Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854 (general 
jurisdiction requires foreign corporation to have “‘continuous and systematic’ affiliation 
with the forum state”); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–
16 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 18. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 154 (7th ed. 2008). 
 19. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 20. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775–80 (1984). 
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 21. Geoffrey Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 241, 283. 
 22. In Shaffer, the Court restricted the availability of quasi in rem jurisdiction in a 
decision that was not unanimous; the concurring decisions sought to narrow the reach of the 
Court’s decision.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(reserving judgment “on whether the ownership of some forms of property whose situs is 
indisputably and permanently located within a State may, without more, provide the 
contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the 
value of the property”); id. at 217–19 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  In Asahi, 
with no decision commanding more than four votes, the Court failed to agree on a standard 
for minimum contacts in stream of commerce cases.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior 
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  Similarly, in Burnham, the Court failed to agree on the reasons 
why in-state service of process on an individual confers jurisdiction over the individual in 
the forum state.  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).  Finally, in Burger King 
and Carnival Cruise, the majority decisions drew sharp dissents questioning the fairness of 
the outcome in the case before the Court.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
See Part II infra.   
  In order to provide a comprehensive account, it is important to note that the 
Supreme Court decided a number of other personal jurisdiction cases between Shaffer in 
1977 and Carnival Cruise in 1991, including World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980), which is discussed infra Part II in connection with Asahi.  See 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (foreign 
corporation’s contacts with Texas, including more than $4 million in purchases from a 
Texas company over a seven-year period, were not “continuous and systematic” and 
therefore did not establish general jurisdiction); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) 
(reporter and editor in Florida could be haled into California forum where plaintiffs resided 
and article was circulated); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (New 
Hampshire could exercise personal jurisdiction over magazine sued for libel where 
circulation of magazines was defendant’s only contact with forum state); Ins. Corp of Ir. v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) (affirming district 
court’s imposition of a discovery sanction to support finding of personal jurisdiction and 
holding that the “Due Process Clause . . . is the only source of the personal jurisdiction 
requirement”); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (Minnesota could not exercise quasi 
in rem jurisdiction over a defendant with no contacts in the forum state by attaching the 
contractual obligation of an insurer that was licensed to do business in the state and required 
to defend and indemnify the defendant in connection with the lawsuit); Kulko v. Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (California could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a parent 
sued for child support where the parent was not a resident or a domiciliary of the state, even 
though the children were domiciled in California).  In all of the decisions except Rush, 
Stevens voted with the majority and did not write a decision.  In Rush, Stevens dissented on 
the question of whether the Minnesota statute authorizing personal jurisdiction over the 
dispute was the “functional equivalent” of constitutionally permissible direct action statute.  
444 U.S. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The fact that Stevens dissented in Rush on a 
narrow doctrinal issue is consistent with his common law approach to judging.  Because the 
issue providing the basis for his dissent does not implicate any of the broader jurisprudential 
points discussed in this Article, the discussion of Stevens’s dissent in Rush is limited to this 
footnote.  This Article does not discuss Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 
(1985), which addressed, among other things, personal jurisdiction in the context of class 
actions.  Justice Stevens wrote separately in that case because of his disagreement with the 
Court’s “‘conflict’ of laws” analysis, but he did not discuss personal jurisdiction in his 
decision.  Id. at 823–25.  
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with limited success.  This was true even though the doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction generally does not involve controversial legal or political 
issues. 
II. THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION CASES: THE COURT’S DECISIONS AND 
JUSTICE STEVENS’S DIFFERENT APPROACH 
A. Resistance to General Rules: Asahi and Shaffer 
1. Shaffer: A General Rule for In Personam and In Rem Jurisdiction 
With Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court embarked upon an 
ambitious—and arguably overdue—effort to provide a comprehensive legal 
framework for evaluating assertions of personal jurisdiction that implicate 
the Due Process clause.  As detailed below, the Court in Shaffer restricted 
the availability of quasi in rem jurisdiction and held that assertions of 
personal jurisdiction based upon property should be analyzed according to 
the fairness approach set out in International Shoe for evaluating assertions 
of personal jurisdiction over persons.23  Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 
decision for the Court in Shaffer is long and scholarly, providing a history 
of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, starting with Pennoyer v. Neff24 and 
 
 23. The Court expressly abolished the “category” of quasi in rem jurisdiction in which 
“the only role played by the property is to provide the basis for bringing the defendant into 
court.”  433 U.S. at 209; see also id. at 196, 199–201, 205–06, 208–09 (discussing in 
personam and in rem categories of jurisdiction).  There are “two types of [quasi in rem] 
jurisdiction,” according to Professor Richard Freer. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
44 (2d ed. 2009). The first, which was not at issue in Shaffer, refers to “cases [that] 
adjudicate the ownership of the property that is used as the jurisdictional predicate, and 
purport to determine the ownership as between and among the parties to the case.”  Id.  The 
second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction refers to cases in which “[t]he property is relevant 
as a jurisdictional predicate only because the plaintiff cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction 
over the defendant . . . [and] the dispute is . . . unrelated to the ownership of the property.”  
Id. at 45–46.  In Shaffer, the Supreme Court “rejected” (and abolished) the second type of 
quasi in rem jurisdiction.  Id. at 90; see also id. at 89–93 (discussing Shaffer). 
 23. The Court expressly abolished the “category” of quasi in rem jurisdiction in which 
“the only role played by the property is to provide the basis for bringing the defendant into 
court.”  433 U.S. at 209; see also id. at 196, 199–201, 205–06, 208–09 (discussing in 
personam and in rem categories of jurisdiction).  There are “two types of [quasi in rem] 
jurisdiction,” according to Professor Richard Freer. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
44 (2d ed. 2009). The first, which was not at issue in Shaffer, refers to “cases [that] 
adjudicate the ownership of the property that is used as the jurisdictional predicate, and 
purport to determine the ownership as between and among the parties to the case.”  Id.  The 
second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction refers to cases in which “[t]he property is relevant 
as a jurisdictional predicate only because the plaintiff cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction 
over the defendant . . . [and] the dispute is . . . unrelated to the ownership of the property.”  
Id. at 45–46.  In Shaffer, the Supreme Court “rejected” (and abolished) the second type of 
quasi in rem jurisdiction.  Id. at 90; see also id. at 89–93 (discussing Shaffer). 
 24. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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discussing a number of cases and secondary authorities to support this new 
framework.25  This Section will summarize the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Shaffer and then describe and discuss Justice Stevens’s brief opinion 
concurring in the judgment.  Stevens was aware of the significance of the 
Court’s opinion and sought to minimize its scope. 
Shaffer v. Heitner involved a shareholder’s derivative suit filed against 
Greyhound Corp. (“Greyhound”), its wholly-owned subsidiary Greyhound 
Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers or directors of one 
or both corporations in Delaware Chancery Court.26  Greyhound was 
incorporated in the State of Delaware, and its principal place of business 
was in Phoenix, Arizona.27  The suit alleged that the defendants had 
“violated their duties” to Greyhound and Greyhound Lines by causing them 
to engage in actions that resulted in more than $13 million in civil damages 
and $600,000 in criminal contempt fines.28  Because Greyhound’s actions 
establishing its liability occurred in the State of Oregon, the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction over Greyhound based upon its illegal activities would 
have been proper in Oregon but not in Delaware.29 
Heitner, the plaintiff, brought suit in state court in Delaware on the 
basis of a Delaware statute30 that authorized the assertion of jurisdiction 
over non-resident defendants solely by virtue of their ownership of stock in 
a Delaware corporation.31  Although none of the stock certificates were 
physically located in Delaware, Delaware nevertheless was considered the 
“situs of ownership” pursuant to another state statute; therefore, the stock 
certificates were considered property in Delaware.32  Heitner proceeded on 
the basis of the rule in Pennoyer v. Neff that the “presence” of the 
individual defendants’ property in-state was sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction in the Delaware forum. 
 
 25. For a detailed discussion of the Court’s decision, see Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer 
v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1978). 
 26. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189–90.  Heitner, the plaintiff in the Delaware Chancery Court 
lawsuit, was a nonresident of Delaware who owned one share of stock in Greyhound 
Corporation.  Id. at 189. 
 27. Id. at 189.  Greyhound Lines, the wholly-owned subsidiary, was incorporated in 
California with its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona.  Id. at 189 n.1. 
 28. Id. at 190 & nn.2, 3. 
 29. Id. at 190; see also id. at 190 n.2; Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 
F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming treble damage award of more than $13 million against 
Greyhound for predatory conduct in violation of antitrust laws), vacated, 437 U.S. 322 
(1978).  
 30. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (2010). 
 31. Schaffer, 433 U.S. at 189.  Heitner filed for an order of sequestration of the 
Greyhound common stock and stock options of the individual defendants pursuant to the 
Delaware statute that allowed the court to compel an appearance of the nonresident by 
seizing their property.  Id. at 190–91.  Pursuant to the signed sequestration order, 82,000 
shares of stock and stock options valued at approximately $1.2 million were seized.  Id. at 
191–92 & n.7. 
 32. Id. at 192 & n.9 (citing tit. 8, § 169). 
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The defendants sought to dismiss the complaint, challenging the 
attachment procedure.33  The defendants also contended that they did not 
have sufficient contacts with the State of Delaware to sustain jurisdiction 
under the standard set out in International Shoe.34  Their arguments were 
rejected by the Delaware Court of Chancery.35  The defendants appealed to 
the Delaware Supreme Court, which affirmed the Court of Chancery.36   
In the decisions of the Delaware courts, much of the discussion 
concerned whether the individual defendants’ due process rights were 
violated because they did not have sufficient notice of the sequestration 
procedure.37  With respect to the defendants’ arguments based on 
International Shoe, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the principles set 
out in that case did not apply because, pursuant to the state statutes, a 
Delaware court could assert quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the 
(statutory) presence of the defendants’ stock in state.38 
The United States Supreme Court reversed.39  In an opinion delivered 
by Justice Marshall, the Court held that the Delaware courts’ exercise of 
jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it based jurisdiction solely on the statutory presence of the 
defendants’ property in Delaware.40  The Court explained that “all 
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the 
standards set forth in International Shoe.”41  As such, this form of quasi in 
rem jurisdiction, or “jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing,” 
essentially was abolished because such jurisdiction was permissible only 
when the non-resident defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum 
state.42  Although the Court substantially limited quasi in rem jurisdiction, 
it nevertheless emphasized that the non-resident defendant’s property may 
be considered as evidence of minimum contacts in the forum state.43 
The Court traced the history of personal jurisdiction doctrine from 
Pennoyer’s emphasis on a state’s absolute jurisdictional power over 
 
 33. Id. at 192–93. 
 34. Id. at 193 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
 35. Id. at 193–94.  The chancery court explained that the purpose of § 366 was to 
compel a nonresident defendant to appear and defend the suit brought against him and that, 
because the sequestration was for a limited purpose and length of time, it did not violate due 
process.  Id. at 193.  Furthermore, the court stated “that the statutory Delaware situs of the 
stock provided a sufficient basis” for the court’s assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction.  Id. 
 36. Id. at 194.  
 37. Id.   
 38. Id. at 194–95 (citing Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (1976), 
rev’d, Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186) (“We hold that seizure of the Greyhound shares is not 
invalid [even though] plaintiff has failed to meet the prior contacts tests of Int’l Shoe.”). 
 39. Id. at 195. 
 40. Id. at 213, 216–17. 
 41. Id. at 212. 
 42. Id. at 207. 
 43. Id. 
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persons and property within its boundaries to International Shoe’s focus on 
fairness based on the defendant’s activities in the forum state.44  
International Shoe’s analysis was limited to personal jurisdiction over 
persons.  Until Shaffer, as the Delaware statutes and state court decisions 
showed, a state had jurisdiction over property within its boundaries 
regardless of whether that exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable or fair.  
In Shaffer, the Court questioned the separate rules for evaluating the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction based on property.45  It noted the 
weakening of the Pennoyer framework regarding in rem jurisdiction, citing 
lower courts that questioned that ownership of property alone, unrelated to 
the underlying dispute, gave a state jurisdiction to adjudicate.46 
The Court reasoned that in rem jurisdiction is the assertion of 
jurisdiction over a person’s interests in a thing and therefore must satisfy 
the minimum contacts standard for due process under International Shoe.47  
The Court explained that this holding would not affect those in rem 
proceedings where the property relates to the claim itself or where the 
ownership of the property serves as evidence of contacts with the forum 
state.48  However, going forward, the presence of a defendant’s property in 
the state would not by itself support jurisdiction, although it might provide 
evidence of ties with the state.49 
The Court rejected the various arguments that supported maintaining 
different approaches depending upon whether the personal jurisdiction was 
based on person or property.50  It dismissed the notion that quasi in rem 
jurisdiction was necessary to maintain in order to prevent a defendant from 
avoiding payment of obligations by “removing his assets to a place where 
he is not subject to an in personam suit.”51  That concern could be 
addressed upon a showing that the defendant was engaged in such activity 
and did not justify an entire jurisdictional category.52 
The Court acknowledged that the Pennoyer regime promoted certainty 
by establishing clear rules based upon a simple concept (if the defendant’s 
property is in the forum state, the assertion of personal jurisdiction is 
 
 44. See id. at 199–204. 
 45. Id. at 205. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 207. 
 48. Id. at 207–08.  Examples of this type of proceeding include title disputes and 
injuries suffered on a defendant’s land.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 209 (“[A]lthough the presence of the defendant’s property in a State might 
suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the 
presence of the property alone would not support the State’s jurisdiction.”). 
 50. See id. at 210. 
 51. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 66 cmt. a (1971)). 
 52. Id.  Furthermore, the Court noted, once personal jurisdiction is secured, the full 
faith and credit clause renders one state’s judgment enforceable in all others.  Id. 
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permissible).53  Nevertheless, the Court stated that in most cases it would 
not be difficult to apply the fairness approach set out in International Shoe, 
and in any event, sacrificing “fair play and substantial justice” was 
unacceptable.54  Similarly, merely invoking the history of the Pennoyer 
rules did not justify them.  The Court stated that “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice” may be just as easily offended by “the 
perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified.”55 
Applying this standard to the facts of Shaffer, the Court concluded that 
the defendants’ voluntary purchase of stock did not provide sufficient 
contacts to support Delaware’s assertion of jurisdiction.56  Although the 
statute was defended as intending to promote supervision over the 
management of its corporations, the Court found no relationship between 
holding a fiduciary position in a corporation and owning stock in that 
corporation.57  The Court stated that if the responsibilities and obligations 
of corporate officers were the primary interest of the state, then Delaware 
should have based jurisdiction on that corporate-fiduciary role rather than 
the presence of property.58  Heitner also argued that appellants, by 
assuming positions as corporate officers in a Delaware corporation, were 
provided substantial benefits by the state;59 therefore, it was reasonable for 
them to answer in the state in return for these benefits.60  The Court found 
this argument unpersuasive as it did not demonstrate that appellants 
“purposefully avail[ed]” themselves of the benefits so that they would have 
reasonably expected to defend themselves in the State.61  Delaware did not 
treat acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction, and it was not 
reasonable for anyone buying securities in a Delaware corporation to 
“impliedly consent” to jurisdiction.62  Thus, Delaware’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over appellants was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause.63 
 
 53. See id. at 211. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 212. 
 56. Id. at 213. 
 57. Id. at 214. 
 58. Id. at 214–15.  In fact, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer, “the 
Delaware legislature enacted a statute purporting to give its courts jurisdiction over officers 
and directors of Delaware corporations in cases related to their activities,” and the 
“Delaware Supreme Court upheld the statute against constitutional attack in Armstrong v. 
Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980).”  YEAZELL, supra note 18, at 93–94; see DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2010).    
 59. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215–16. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (noting that 
Heitner’s line of reasoning suggests that although Delaware law may appropriately govern, 
Delaware does not have jurisdiction). 
 62. Id. at 216. 
 63. Id. at 216–17.  Justice Marshall’s decision for the Court was joined in full by five 
other justices and in part by Justice William Brennan, who agreed with parts I through III 
articulating the new rule.  Id. at 220.  However, Justice Brennan disagreed with Part IV 
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Justice Stevens did not join any part of the Court’s decision and 
instead wrote a short opinion concurring in the judgment.64  Stevens agreed 
with the concurring opinion of Justice Lewis Powell that the majority’s 
opinion “should not be read to invalidate quasi in rem jurisdiction where 
real estate is involved.”65 
Justice Stevens reasoned that the Due Process Clause protects against 
“judgments without notice.”66  He explained that notice comes in two forms 
for nonresident defendants: actual notice in the historical form of 
publication, registered mail, or personal service outside the state, and “fair 
notice,” which is fair warning that the defendant’s activity may subject him 
to the jurisdiction of the state.67  Activities such as purchasing real estate, 
visiting, or opening a bank account in the state serve as fair notice because 
the defendant should expect that the state may “exercise its power over 
[his] property or . . . person while there.”68 
With respect to the defendants in Shaffer, Justice Stevens asserted that 
purchasing securities on the open market did not provide fair notice of 
Delaware’s power to exercise jurisdiction.69  He explained that “[o]ne who 
purchases shares of stock on the open market can hardly be expected to 
know that he has thereby become subject to suit in a forum remote from his 
residence and unrelated to the transaction.”70  He added that although it was 
reasonable to expect a purchaser of stock from a corporation in a foreign 
country to research international law, it was not reasonable to expect the 
purchaser of stock in a domestic corporation to research the law of the state 
of incorporation to determine whether any applicable laws related to the 
situs of the stock would raise jurisdictional issues at some future date.71  In 
fact, he stated, the Delaware statute created “an unacceptable risk of 
judgment without notice” because Delaware was the only state that 
considered stock to be located in the corporation’s state of incorporation, 
even where the actual certificates and owner were not within the State.72  
 
because he believed that properly applied, the new rule established that Delaware had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants in this case.  Id. 
 64. Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 65. Id. at 219 (emphasis omitted). 
 66. Id. at 218 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324 (Black, J.) 
(1945)).  Justice Stevens’s citation to Justice Black’s opinion rather than the opinion of the 
Court suggests that he may not have wholeheartedly endorsed the minimum contacts 
standard, especially when used to undermine traditionally accepted methods of obtaining 
jurisdiction.  See Cox, supra note 3, at 533–34.  
 67. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 218–19. 
 72. Id. at 218. 
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The statute therefore imposed an inherent, unknown risk for every 
purchaser of a domestic market security to have to litigate in Delaware.73 
Justice Stevens concluded by articulating his concern with the breadth 
of the majority’s opinion and how it would be applied in other contexts.74  
He would not have invalidated quasi in rem jurisdiction in cases of real 
property or in the other traditional methods of establishing jurisdiction 
where the defendant had received adequate notice of both the actual 
controversy and where his activity could subject him to that state’s 
jurisdiction.75   
Justice Stevens’s decision to write separately, and his refusal to join 
the opinion of the Court because of its unnecessarily broad holding, was 
entirely consistent with his common law approach to judging.  Moreover, 
his concurrence rested upon an analysis of the property that authorized the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction—shares of stock sold on the open 
market—rather than the more general categories of in personam and in rem 
jurisdiction.76  Stevens thus decided the case narrowly and expressed his 
disagreement with the court’s having decided “a great deal more than is 
necessary to dispose of this case.”77 
2. Asahi: The Stream of Commerce Tests 
Subsequent to Shaffer and the Court’s applying the minimum contacts 
approach set out in International Shoe to assertions of personal jurisdiction 
over property as well as persons, the Court decided several cases involving 
the exercise of specific jurisdiction.78  The most important was World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,79 in which the Court elaborated on the 
notion that “purposeful availment” is necessary to support the forum state’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.80  In 
 
 73. Id.  Justice Stevens also found the Delaware statute to be unconstitutional because 
it forced the defendant to choose between defending on the merits and subjecting himself to 
the unlimited jurisdiction of the court or the loss of his property.  Id. at 218–19. 
 74. Id. at 219. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 218–19. 
 77. Id. at 219. 
 78. See also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 
(2011) (“Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on 
circumstances that warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction, particularly in cases 
involving ‘single or occasional acts’ occurring or having their impact within the forum 
State.”).   
 79. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 80. The Court held that the retail seller of an automobile, located in New York, and its 
wholesale distributor, which did business in the Northeast, could not be haled into an 
Oklahoma forum because neither defendant had contacts with the State of Oklahoma or 
attempted to do business in the state.  Id. at 298.  That is, neither defendant “purposefully 
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.”  Id. at 297 
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).  The majority decision was written 
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addition, World-Wide Volkswagen is apparently the first case in which the 
Court articulated the five factors to be analyzed when determining whether 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” have been 
“offend[ed]” by the exercise of personal jurisdiction.81  World-Wide 
Volkswagen involved an attempt to exercise specific jurisdiction over a 
retail seller and its wholesale distributor.82  An open question remained as 
to what showing was necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction over the 
out-of-state manufacturer of a product (and the out-of-state manufacturers 
of component parts of a product) sold into the forum state.  The Court 
addressed that question in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,83 
decided seven years after World-Wide Volkswagen. 
In Asahi, the Supreme Court addressed the standard for establishing 
minimum contacts in a case involving the sale or delivery of products in the 
stream of commerce.84  Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the Court; 
however, she could gather only three other votes85 to support her view that 
the mere placement of a product in the stream of commerce by a foreign 
company was not sufficient to establish purposeful availment by that 
company.86  In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan championed a less 
demanding standard, one that only required the sale or delivery of a product 
in the stream of commerce.87  Because Justice Stevens did not join either 
decision with respect to the standard for minimum contacts,88 the Court 
could not and did not establish a general rule for establishing personal 
jurisdiction in a stream-of-commerce case.  His refusal to join either 
opinion was entirely consistent with his reluctance to rely on a general rule 
to decide a case, especially where the case could be decided without the 
articulation of such a rule.89 
 
by Justice Byron White and received the vote of Justice Stevens.  Id. at 286.  Three justices 
dissented, including Justice Brennan.  Id. at 286, 299. 
 81. Id. at 292 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).  As 
the citations in the relevant paragraph of the Court’s decision demonstrate, the different 
factors had been set out in previous cases; however, World-Wide Volkswagen represents the 
first decision in which the different factors were collected and presented as part of “fair play 
and substantial justice” inquiry. 
 82. Id. at 288. 
 83. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 84. Id. at 105. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 112. 
 87. Id. at 117. 
 88. Id. at 121. 
 89. The Supreme Court revisited the stream-of-commerce theory of personal 
jurisdiction  in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), a products 
liability lawsuit in which the British manufacturer of a metal-shearing machine was sued in 
New Jersey by a man who injured himself using the machine in that state.  As noted in the 
text preceding this footnote, the Court in Asahi did not agree on the standard for establishing 
personal jurisdiction in a stream-of-commerce case.  In McIntyre, the Court again failed to 
agree on the standard in such a case.  Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion rejected the 
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Asahi arose out of a motorcycle accident that occurred on September 
23, 1978, when Gary Zurcher was severely injured and his wife was killed 
after he lost control of his motorcycle and collided with a tractor on a 
highway in California.90  About a year later, Zurcher filed a product-
liability lawsuit in California Superior Court alleging that the accident was 
caused by the motorcycle’s defective tire, tube, and sealant; specifically, 
Zurcher claimed that the defective products caused the tire to explode while 
he and his wife were riding the motorcycle and that malfunction of the tire 
caused the accident.91 
Zurcher sued a number of defendants, including Cheng Shin Rubber 
Industrial Co., Ltd. (“Cheng Shin”), the manufacturer of the tube used in 
the motorcycle tire.92  Cheng Shin then filed a cross-complaint seeking 
indemnification from Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. (“Asahi”), the 
manufacturer of the tube’s valve assembly.93  Eventually Zurcher settled 
with Cheng Shin and the other defendants so that the only remaining 
dispute in the lawsuit was Cheng Shin’s indemnity action against Asahi.94  
Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin’s service of summons, arguing that 
California’s exercise of jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.95 
The record established that Asahi was a Japanese corporation that 
manufactured tire valve assemblies in Japan and sold them to Cheng Shin 
in Taiwan for use in finished tire tubes.96  Along with valve assemblies 
from other suppliers, Cheng Shin bought and installed  
 
standard set out by Justice Brennan, which he characterized as a “rule based on general 
notions of fairness and foreseeability” and found was “inconsistent with the premises of 
lawful judicial power.”  Id. at 2789.  Justice Kennedy elaborated that “it is the defendant’s 
actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.”  Id.  
Justice Kennedy held that the defendant, the British manufacturer, did not purposefully avail 
itself of the New Jersey market and therefore could not be sued in state court in New Jersey.  
Id. at 2790–91.  However, his decision did not garner five votes and therefore only resolved 
the case but did not establish a rule.  Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a 
concurring opinion in which he stated that “[n]one of the Court’s precedents finds that a 
single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here 
[specifically the use of an independent distributor in the United States], is sufficient” for the 
New Jersey court to exercise jurisdiction over the British manufacturer.  Id. at 2791.  Justice 
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented.  She argued that the British 
manufacturer, which “targeted a national market, including any and all states” through a 
distributor, should be “answerable in New Jersey for the harm [the plaintiff] suffered at his 
workplace in that State.”  Id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
 90. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. 
 91. Id. at 106. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 106. 
 95. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004) (authorizing jurisdiction 
“on any basis not inconsistent with the state or federal Constitutions”). 
 96. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106. 
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150,000 Asahi valve assemblies in 1978; 500,000 in 1979; 
500,000 in 1980; 100,000 in 1981; and 100,000 in 1982.  Sales to 
Cheng Shin accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi’s income in 
1981 and 0.44 percent in 1982.  Cheng Shin alleged that 
approximately 20 percent of its sales in the United States [were] 
in California.97   
Although Cheng Shin claimed that Asahi was aware of the company’s 
California sales, Asahi insisted that it had not contemplated that it would be 
subject to lawsuits in California given the small percentage of sales to 
Cheng Shin.98   
 The California Superior Court denied Asahi’s motion to quash.  This 
decision was reversed by the California Court of Appeals.99  However, the 
Court of Appeals then was reversed by the California Supreme Court, 
which held that Asahi’s knowledge that some of the tires would be sold in 
California, and the fact that Asahi indirectly benefitted from those sales, 
were sufficient to establish jurisdiction in California under the stream–of-
commerce doctrine.100  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and reversed.101  As noted above, the Court divided on the appropriate 
standard for stream-of-commerce jurisdiction, but agreed—with the 
exception of Justice Scalia—that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
Asahi would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”102 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 107. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 108. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 113 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).  The 
Court considered the factors set out in World-Wide Volkswagen to determine the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction including the burden on Asahi, California’s interests in 
maintaining jurisdiction, and Cheng Shin’s interest in obtaining relief.  Id. at 113.  As 
Justice O’Connor wrote, the burden on Asahi would be severe because it would have to 
travel to another country and subject itself to a foreign judicial system.  Id. at 114.  
California’s interests were minimal because both parties were foreign and the transaction 
took place overseas.  Id.  California’s interest in consumer-safety standards were minimal, at 
best, because the deterrent effect of imposing jurisdiction would still be served as long as 
parties that purchased (and then sold) Asahi’s products, such as Cheng Shin, were subject to 
suit in California.  Id. at 115.  Additionally, Cheng Shin did not demonstrate that jurisdiction 
in California would be more convenient than in its own country or Japan.  Id.  Finally, the 
Court held that neither “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies” nor the “shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies” weighed in favor of California retaining 
jurisdiction over the indemnification dispute that remained between two foreign 
corporations.  Id. at 113 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 292 (1980)).  The Court therefore held that California’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction was not “consistent with fair play and substantial justice.”  Id. at 116. 
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In Part II-A of her opinion, Justice O’Connor—joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist  and Justices Powell and Scalia—addressed whether placing a 
product into the stream of commerce constituted the “purposeful 
availment” necessary to establish minimum contacts.103  The Court noted 
that since World-Wide Volkswagen, lower courts have been divided when 
confronted with stream-of-commerce cases.104  While some courts had 
permitted jurisdiction when the defendant merely placed a product in the 
stream of commerce knowing that the product would be sold in that state, 
other courts had permitted jurisdiction only with an additional showing of 
purposeful availment.105 
Justice O’Connor agreed with the latter position, which required more 
than mere placement of a product in the stream of commerce in order to 
satisfy due process.106  Applying this standard, the Court reasoned that even 
if Asahi was aware that its product would end up in California, Cheng Shin 
had not demonstrated that Asahi purposefully availed itself of the 
California market.107  O’Connor noted that “Asahi [did] not do business in 
California,” nor did it “advertise or otherwise solicit business in 
California”;108 Asahi “did not create, control, or employ the distribution 
system that brought its valve [assemblies] to California”; and there was no 
evidence that Asahi specifically designed its product “in anticipation of 
sales in California.”109  Justice O’Connor concluded that California’s 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Asahi violated due process.110  This 
discussion drew explicitly on the discussion of purposeful availment and 
foreseeability in World-Wide Volkswagen but did not garner the vote of 
Justice White, who wrote the Court’s decision in that case.111 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argued that mere placement 
of a product in the stream of commerce was sufficient to establish 
purposeful availment and therefore concluded that Asahi had established 
minimum contacts.112  Brennan stated that “[t]he stream of commerce refers 
not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated 
 
 103. Id. at 108–09. 
 104. Id. at 110. 
 105. Id. at 110–12. 
 106. Id. at 112. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 112–13. 
 110. Id. at 113. 
 111. See id. at 109–11 (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp), 105 (reporting that 
Justice White did not join Part II-A of the Court’s opinion in Asahi). 
 112. See generally id. at 116–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  Brennan stated that “[t]he stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable 
currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to 
distribution to retail sale” and concluded that “[a]s long as a participant in this process is 
aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit 
there cannot come as a surprise.”  Id. at 117. 
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flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale” and 
concluded that “[a]s long as a participant in this process is aware that the 
final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a 
lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”113  Brennan’s concurrence was 
joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall, all of whom agreed 
with the holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would offend 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.114 
Justice Stevens did not join the opinions of either Justice O’Connor or 
Justice Brennan with respect to minimum contacts.115  Joining only in Parts 
I and II-B of O’Connor’s decision, but not Part II-A, Stevens stated that the 
case could be decided solely on the grounds that personal jurisdiction over 
Asahi was “unreasonable and unfair.”116  In his view, because the Court did 
not have to develop a new rule, it should not have done so and instead 
should have decided the case based on already-established rules governing 
personal jurisdiction.117 
In dicta, Justice Stevens nevertheless applied the facts of the case to 
the “stream of commerce plus” rule set out by Justice O’Connor and 
concluded that in fact Asahi satisfied her higher standard for purposeful 
availment.  He observed that “Asahi ha[d] arguably engaged in a higher 
quantum of conduct than ‘[t]he placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce, without more’”118 and noted that Asahi delivered over 100,000 
valve assemblies annually over a period of several years.119  Such activity, 
Stevens suggested, could constitute “purposeful availment” even though 
the valve assembly was a standard product marketed worldwide.120  Stevens 
presented this analysis as dicta to avoid making a “constitutional 
determination” based upon the amount, value, and hazardous character of 
the particular product.121 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence was a model of judicial restraint.  His 
decision was narrow, resolving the case solely on the grounds of fair play 
and substantial justice and thereby avoiding unnecessary “constitutional 
 
 113. Id. at 117. 
 114. Id. at 116.  
 115. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justices 
White and Blackmun joined his concurrence.  Id. 
 116. Id. at 121–22; see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 
(2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Given the confines of the controversy, the dueling 
opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice O’Connor were hardly necessary.”).  
 117. Id. at 122 (“I see no reason for the plurality to articulate ‘purposeful direction’ or 
any other test as the nexus between the act of a defendant and the forum State that is 
necessary to establish minimum contacts.”). 
 118. Id. at 122 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (majority opinion)) (alteration in 
original). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 121. See id. 
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adjudication.”122  Furthermore, by not joining the decision of either 
O’Connor or Brennan with respect to minimum contacts, Stevens denied a 
fifth vote to each decision.  Therefore neither decision had the five votes 
necessary to become the rule for future cases; instead, the Court only was 
able to decide the case before it.  By deciding the case under established 
rules with respect to fair play and substantial justice, Stevens prevented the 
Court from articulating a new rule with respect to minimum contacts in 
stream-of-commerce cases—and thereby constrained the Court from acting 
in a manner that was not consistent with his general view of how cases 
should be decided.123 
B. Focusing on Fairness: Burger King & Carnival Cruise 
Shaffer and Asahi illustrated Stevens’s resistance to articulating 
general rules and developing new rules when existing rules were sufficient 
to decide the case before the Court.  Shaffer and Asahi also reflected 
Stevens’s concern for a fair result.  In Shaffer, Stevens did not believe that 
the purchase or ownership of stock alone should subject a non-resident to 
personal jurisdiction,124 while in Asahi, Stevens based his decision on 
principles of fair play and substantial justice,125 the Court’s phrase for 
ensuring fairness in the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  In the two cases 
discussed in this section, Stevens’s concern for fairness—in particular his 
concern for a fair result based on the facts of the particular case—led him 
to dissent in each case.  It is worth noting that each case involves the 
intersection of principles of contract law with the rules of personal 
jurisdiction.  As discussed below, contract law invites consideration of the 
balance of power between the parties as well as their sophistication and 
therefore permits the court to consider the fairness of the transaction 
between the parties.   
1. Burger King: Haling the Local Franchisee Across State Lines 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burger King Corporation v. 
Rudzewicz126 illustrates a different aspect of the common law judicial 
approach taken by Justice Stevens.  Burger King is perhaps most well-
known as the Supreme Court’s principal personal jurisdiction decision 
involving claims for breach of contract.127  The Court decided by a 7–2 
vote—with Justice Brennan writing for the Court and Stevens (joined by 
 
 122. See Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, supra note 13, at 37.   
 123. The Supreme Court declined to consider stream-of-commerce jurisdiction until 
after Stevens resigned.  See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), 
discussed supra note 89 and infra Conclusion.  
 124. See supra note 64–76 and accompanying text.  
 125. See supra notes 112–117 and accompanying text.  
 126. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 127. Id. at 466. 
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Justice White) dissenting—that Florida could exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a franchisee who conducted business exclusively in Michigan because 
of the nature of the contractual dealings between the parties.128  Burger 
King also is well-known because it sought to clarify the relationship 
between minimum contacts and fair play and substantial justice in a 
specific-jurisdiction case.129  Stevens argued in his dissent that it would not 
be fair for Burger King, the franchisor, to be able to hale its franchisee into 
its home state and out of the franchisee’s state.130  His decision emphasized 
the disparity in power between the parties, focused on the facts of the 
particular case, and relied on the more detailed discussion of the federal 
court of appeals decision that ultimately was reversed by the Supreme 
Court.131 
The litigation grew out of a franchise agreement that was entered into 
in June 1979 between Burger King, a Florida corporation, and John 
Rudzewicz and Brian MacShara to operate a Burger King restaurant in 
Drayton Plains, Michigan.132  The restaurant initially performed well; 
however, with the advent of a recession later that year, business declined 
and the franchisees fell behind in monthly payments required under the 
agreement.133  Negotiations between the parties were unsuccessful, and 
Burger King terminated the franchise and demanded that Rudzewicz and 
MacShara vacate.134  Rudzewicz and MacShara refused and ended up being 
sued by Burger King in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida in May 1981.135 
Burger King asserted that there was personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants in Florida because they failed to make payments “at [its] place 
of business in Miami, Dade County, Florida.”136  The District Court agreed 
with Burger King and ultimately entered a judgment in its favor.137  On 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the grounds that Rudzewicz did 
not have reasonable notice of the possibility of franchise litigation in 
 
 128. See id. at 479–83 (discussing parties’ negotiations and contract terms), 487 
(because defendant franchisee “established a substantial and continuing relationship with 
Burger King’s Miami headquarters, received fair notice from the contract documents and 
the course of dealing that he might be subject to suit in Florida, and has failed to 
demonstrate how jurisdiction in that forum would be fundamentally unfair,” Florida forum 
had personal jurisdiction over franchisee). 
 129. Id. at 477–78. 
 130. Id. at 487–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 487–89. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 468.  Under the agreement, John Rudzewicz was personally liable for over 
$1 million of payments over twenty years.  Id. at 467. 
 134. Id. at 468  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 469.  Burger King was awarded $228,875 in damages. Id. In addition, the 
district court ordered the defendants to close the restaurant. Id. 
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Florida.138  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of 
Appeals.139 
Justice Brennan’s decision for the Court set out the precedent related 
to state court jurisdiction over non-resident defendants and the nature of the 
Due Process liberty interest articulated in International Shoe.140  A 
defendant who has “‘deliberately’ . . . engaged in significant activities” in 
the state141 or created “‘continuing obligations’ between himself” and a 
resident of the state is considered to have “availed himself of the privilege 
of conducting business there.”142  Because the defendant benefitted from 
that state’s laws, it is reasonable for that defendant to bear the burden of 
litigating there.143  Once the defendant’s contacts have been established as 
purposeful, the Court explained, to avoid jurisdiction, the defendant must 
present a compelling argument that the burden is nonetheless unreasonable 
and does not comport with “fair play and substantial justice.”144  More 
specifically, the defendant must show that litigation in the forum state 
poses extraordinary difficulty and inconvenience, leaving him at a severe 
disadvantage to his opposition.145 
The Court then detailed the defendants’ contacts with Florida, 
describing the franchisees’ relationship with the corporate office in Miami.  
It described the “day-to-day monitoring of franchisees” by Burger King’s 
district office in Michigan.146  Brennan described Burger King’s two-tiered 
administrative structure, which gave primary responsibility and authority to 
the Miami headquarters, and the franchise contract, which required 
payments and certain notifications to Miami and established that the 
relationship began in Miami and was governed by Florida law.147  The 
Court reasoned that even though Rudzewicz had no physical ties to Florida, 
 
 138. Id. at 469–70.  Only Burger King’s contract damages were at issue on appeal.  Id. 
at 469 n.11.  The Court explained that MacShara did not appeal and Rudzewicz settled with 
respect to Burger King’s trademark claim and the District Court’s entry of injunctive relief.  
Id.  
 139. Id. at 471. 
 140. Id. at 471–72.  Quoting Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Shaffer, the Court noted 
that “individuals [must] have ‘fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to 
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign’” so that they can conduct their affairs accordingly.  
Id. at 472 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).  
The Court stated that where a defendant has “purposely directed” his activities at residents 
of the forum, “fair warning” is satisfied.  Id. at 472 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 
465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). 
 141. Id. at 475–76 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781). 
 142. Id. at 476 (quoting Travelers Health Ass’n. v. Virgina, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 476–77 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). 
 145. Id. at 478 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).  
The Court noted, however, that measures such as application of choice-of-law rules or 
changing venue often would provide the appropriate relief.  Id. at 477. 
 146. Id. at 464–66. 
 147. Id. at 465–66. 
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his franchise dispute arose directly from “a contract which had [a] 
substantial connection with that State.”148 
The Court found that rather than operating a local, independent 
business, Rudzewicz voluntarily and deliberately reached outside Michigan 
and negotiated with a Florida corporation for a long-term franchise 
agreement in order to enjoy the many benefits associated with a nationwide 
organization.149  Rudzewicz negotiated and entered into a twenty-year 
relationship that resulted in “continuing and wide-reaching contacts with 
Burger King in Florida.”150  The Court added that Rudzewicz’s continued 
refusal to make payments in Miami and use of Burger King’s trademarks 
after termination of the contract caused foreseeable injuries to the Florida 
corporation and served as fair warning that he should have reasonably 
anticipated litigation in that state.151 
 Although it acknowledged the argument that Rudzewicz had no reason 
to anticipate suit outside of Michigan given the dealings with and 
supervision by the Michigan office, the Court nonetheless concluded that 
he “most certainly knew” that he was associating himself with a Florida 
corporation based on the contract itself.152  The choice-of-law provision 
stated that all disputes would be governed by Florida law and demonstrated 
Rudzewicz’s deliberate affiliation with Florida, establishing that he should 
have expected to defend himself there should litigation occur.153 
As to whether any factors outweighed purposeful availment and 
established that Florida’s jurisdiction was unconstitutional, the Court 
concluded that Florida had a legitimate state interest in holding Rudzewicz 
answerable on a claim related to his contacts in the State.154  The Court 
rejected Rudzewicz’s argument that many aspects of the franchise 
agreement were governed by Michigan’s Franchise Investment Law155 and 
stated that he failed to show how Michigan’s concurrent interest rendered 
Florida’s jurisdiction unconstitutional.156  Addressing the Eleventh 
Circuit’s conclusion that Florida litigation would severely impair 
Rudzewicz’s ability to call essential Michigan witnesses, the Court stated 
that these claims lacked support in the record and that, regardless, the 
 
 148. Id. at 479 (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). 
 149. Id. at 479–80. 
 150. Id. at 480. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 482. 
 154. Id. at 482–83. 
 155. Id. at 483 & n.25 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1501 et seq. (1979)) (noting in 
footnote 26 that Burger King complied with Michigan’s Franchise Act and that the Act does 
not confer exclusive jurisdiction in Michigan). 
 156. Id. at 483. 
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remedy typically was change of venue rather than dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction.157 
The Court also rejected the arguments that Rudzewicz was a victim of 
unequal bargaining power who did not receive “fair notice.”158  It instead 
deferred to the District Court’s factual finding that he and MacShara were 
“sophisticated” and that they were never under economic duress or 
disadvantaged by Burger King.159  Stating that there is no standard formula 
and that the facts in each case must be weighed individually, the Court also 
rejected the assertion that its ruling would permit jurisdiction over 
franchisees or consumers owing more modest debts and result in default 
judgments.160  The Court concluded that because Rudzewicz had a 
continuous and substantial relationship with the Miami headquarters, 
received fair notice from the course of dealing and the contract documents 
themselves, and failed to demonstrate that Florida’s jurisdiction would be 
unfair, “the District Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction [over the 
defendants] did not offend due process.”161 
 Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the result was unfair.162  He 
noted Rudzewicz’s lack of contacts with Florida, the forum state.163  
Specifically, Stevens observed that Rudzewicz did not maintain a place of 
business or employees in Florida, nor was he licensed to do business in 
Florida.164  In addition, “his business, property, and payroll taxes were [all] 
payable in [Michigan], and he sold all of his products there.”165  Moreover, 
Stevens contended that the Michigan district office handled all of the 
“principal contacts” with Rudzewicz.166  In his dissent, Stevens adopted 
Judge Vance’s opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.167  
 Judge Vance found that Rudzewicz also was financially ill-equipped 
for suit in Florida.168  Despite the fact that the franchise was nationally 
 
 157. Id. at 483–84; see also id. at n.25. 
 158. Id. at 484. 
 159. Id. “Rudzewicz was represented by counsel,” and he was an experienced 
accountant who engaged in a five-month negotiation with Burger King and “obligated 
himself personally to contracts” requiring over $1 million in payments over time.  Id. at 485 
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Macshara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984)).  But see id. 
at 489–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 485–86 (majority opinion). 
 161. Id. at 487. 
 162. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. (Rudzewicz “did not prepare his French fries, shakes, and hamburgers in 
Michigan, and then deliver them into the stream of commerce ‘with the expectation that 
they [would] be purchased by consumers in’ Florida” (quoting id. at 473 (majority 
opinion))). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 488. 
 168. Id. at 489 (quoting Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1512). 
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affiliated, the restaurant was primarily a local business serving a specific 
geographic community, and its revenues typically would not support the 
cost of remote litigation.169  Furthermore, Rudzewicz did not benefit from 
price concessions in exchange for the added risk of suit in Florida and 
instead signed a standard-form contract with non-negotiable terms.170  
Since Rudzewicz lacked reasonable notice of litigation in Florida and was 
financially unprepared for such a suit, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
jurisdiction in Florida “offend[ed] the fundamental fairness which is the 
touchstone of due process.”171 
Although Justice Brennan canvassed the relevant facts, he emphasized 
the precedential rules governing specific jurisdiction rather than the notion 
of “fundamental fairness” that informed Justice Stevens’s dissent.172  
Stevens was particularly critical of the majority’s reliance on standard 
contract language, such as provisions concerning choice of law, payments, 
and authority.173  He characterized that analysis as “superficial” and 
contended that it created the “potential for unfairness . . . in negotiations 
between franchisors and their franchisees [and] . . . the resolution of . . . 
disputes.”174 
Stevens relied on Judge Vance’s discussion of Rudzewicz’s contacts 
with the two states and his conclusion that the contacts with the district 
office in Michigan were so substantial that it was reasonable for Rudzewicz 
to not anticipate litigation in Florida.  Furthermore, the question for Stevens 
was not whether there was some minimal basis for personal jurisdiction in 
Florida over Rudzewicz, but whether it would be fair to hale the local 
franchisee from Michigan into the Florida forum when the activity under 
the contract was focused on Michigan.  This fact-specific approach 
illustrates his overarching concern with arriving at a fair result in the 
dispute between the parties. 
Justice Stevens also expressed concern about the potential for 
unfairness in negotiations between franchisors and franchisees where the 
franchisor is typically dominant.175  Justice Brennan focused on 
Rudzewicz’s sophistication and concluded that Florida’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over him was fair.176  Stevens, however, argued that 
regardless of Rudzewicz’s sophistication, he nevertheless was an individual 
who did not stand on equal footing in his negotiations with Burger King.177  
Stevens viewed the relationship between a national franchisor and a local 
 
 169. Id. (quoting Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1512). 
 170. Id. at 489–90 (quoting Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1512–13). 
 171. Id. at 490 (quoting Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1513). 
 172. See id. 
 173. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 489 (quoting Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1512). 
 176. Id. at 485 (majority opinion). 
 177. Id. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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franchisee as embodying a “characteristic disparity of bargaining power” 
borne out by the history of the relationship between the parties.178  
Although Stevens’s consideration of the future impact of the ruling would 
seem to be at odds with his preference for narrow decisions,179 his 
discussion was not the “conjuring up [of] horrible possibilities that never 
happen in the real world,”180 but instead a practical acknowledgment of the 
inevitable disputes between franchisors and franchisees.181 
2. Carnival Cruise: Enforcing a Forum-Selection Clause Against a 
Passenger on a Cruise Line 
The issue of fundamental fairness in the personal jurisdiction context 
also was addressed in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.182  In Carnival 
Cruise, the Court addressed whether a forum-selection clause printed on a 
cruise ticket issued by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (“Carnival”), a Florida 
corporation, to Washington State residents Eulala and Russel Shute was 
reasonable and enforceable.183 
The Shutes purchased passage for a cruise on the Tropicale through a 
Washington State travel agent who forwarded the payment to Carnival’s 
headquarters in Florida.184  The Shutes then received the tickets from 
Carnival in Washington State.185  Each ticket contained a forum-selection 
clause specifying that by accepting the ticket, the purchaser agreed that “all 
disputes . . . arising under . . . this Contract shall be litigated . . . [only] in 
the State of Florida.”186 
The Shutes boarded the ship in California, which sailed to Mexico and 
back.187  Eulala Shute was injured when she slipped and fell during a tour 
while the ship was in international waters off the Mexico coast.188  The 
Shutes filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Washington, asserting a claim sounding in negligence against 
Carnival.189  Carnival moved for summary judgment, contending that 
 
 178. Id. (quoting Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1512). 
 179. See Popkin, supra note 2, at 1109 (noting that Justice Stevens’s objection to the 
Court’s consideration of hypothetical scenarios is closely related to his concern with overly 
broad rulings). 
 180. John Paul Stevens, Random Recollections, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 281 (2005) 
(quoting with approval Justice Blackmun in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)). 
 181. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 182. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 183. Id. at 587. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. at 587–88. 
 187. Id. at 588. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. 
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Florida was the forum agreed upon for resolution of any dispute.190  
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the forum-selection clause, 
prompting Carnival to petition the Supreme Court.191  The Court reversed 
the Ninth Circuit.192  Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, 
which received seven votes.193  
The Supreme Court initially noted that because this was a case in 
admiralty, federal law would govern enforceability of the forum-selection 
clause.194  In addition, because the Shutes conceded that they were aware of 
the clause, they could not and did not assert that enforcement of the 
contract violated due process on notice grounds.195   
Before the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, both parties relied on 
a prior Supreme Court decision, The Bremen,196 to support their 
contentions.197  The Bremen involved a commercial contract negotiated 
between an American corporation and a German corporation “for the 
towage of . . . [a] rig from Louisiana to” a location “off the coast of 
Italy.”198  The corporations agreed that any contractual dispute was to be 
resolved in the London Court of Justice.199  The Court recognized that the 
agreement in The Bremen involved a “far from routine transaction” where 
the forum was likely to have been selected with great care.  The Shutes 
contended—successfully before the Court of Appeals—that The Bremen 
could not be invoked to validate the forum-selection clause in their case 
because they were “not business persons and did not negotiate the terms of 
the clause” with Carnival Cruise.200  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding 
that the evaluation of “reasonableness” required under The Bremen meant 
that the Court had to “refine [its] analysis . . . to account for the realities of 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 588–89. 
 192. Id. at 597. 
 193. Id. at 586.  
 194. Id. at 590.  Although the only question before the Supreme Court was whether the 
forum-selection clause should be enforced, there was extensive litigation in the lower courts 
over the issue of minimum contacts.  The District Court granted Carnival Cruise’s motion 
for summary judgment on the grounds that its contacts “with Washington were 
constitutionally insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 588.  
The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that “but for” Carnival Cruise’s “solicitation of 
business in Washington,” the Shutes “would not have taken the cruise and Mrs. Shute would 
not have been injured.”  Id.; see also id. at 588 n.* (explaining that the Court of Appeals had 
filed an earlier opinion that was withdrawn and then modified after the Washington 
Supreme Court provided an affirmative answer to the certified question of whether the 
Washington long-arm statute conferred personal jurisdiction over Carnival Cruise). 
 195. Id.  
 196. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 197. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 590–91. 
 198. Id. at 591.  
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 592.   
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form passage contracts.”201  According to Justice Blackmun, the Ninth 
Circuit ignored the circumstances in which cruise line tickets were sold to 
passengers when it applied the reasonableness factors set out in The 
Bremen and thus distorted that holding.202  The Court held that in the 
context of form passage contracts, a forum-selection clause that has not 
been negotiated nonetheless may be enforceable.203   
The Court cited several reasons for enforcing such a clause: the 
“special interest” a cruise line has in limiting where it can be subject to 
suit; sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to determine 
the correct forum, thus conserving judicial resources; and the money saved 
by limiting the forum in which it can be sued, which could then be passed 
on to purchasers in the form of reduced ticket prices.204  The Court rejected 
the Circuit Court’s finding that the Shutes were “physically and financially 
incapable of pursuing this litigation in Florida,” characterizing it as 
“conclusory.”205  In analyzing the “serious inconvenience” of the forum as 
required by The Bremen, the Court of Appeals incorrectly analogized 
Florida to a “remote alien forum” and characterized the dispute as a local 
one better suited to resolution in Washington rather than Florida.206  
Because of these distinctions, and the fact that the Shutes acknowledged 
that they had notice of the forum selection clause, the Court concluded that 
“‘heavy burden of proof’ required to set aside the forum-selection clause on 
grounds of inconvenience” had not been met.207 
In evaluating the fundamental fairness of the forum-selection clause, 
the Court found no indication that Carnival was acting in bad faith by 
selecting Florida as the forum.  Carnival’s principal place of business was 
in Florida and many of its cruises departed from and returned to there.208  In 
addition, the Court found no evidence of fraud or overreaching.209  Finally, 
the Court concluded that the Shutes’ argument that the forum-selection 
clause violated 46 U.S.C. App. § 183c was unavailing.210  The statute 
prohibited a vessel owner from inserting a provision in any contract that 
deprived a claimant of a trial “by court of competent jurisdiction” for loss 
of life or personal injury resulting from negligence.211  Here, the forum-
selection clause specifically stated that Florida was the forum for all 
 
 201. Id. at 591–93.   
 202. Id. at 593. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 593–94. 
 205. Id. at 594 (quoting Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 
1990), rev’d, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)). 
 206. Id. (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972)). 
 207. Id. at 594–95 (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17). 
 208. Id. at 595. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. at 595–96 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988)). 
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disputes, and a court in the state of Florida was a “court of competent 
jurisdiction” within the meaning of the statute.212  According to Justice 
Blackmun, § 183c did not prohibit the use of a forum selection clause.213 
Justice Stevens dissented, concluding that the forum-selection clause 
was unenforceable because it did not provide adequate notice, violated the 
Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 183c, and 
was invalid as contrary to public policy and common law prior to The 
Bremen.214 
Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court’s assumption that a passenger 
is “fully and fairly” notified of the forum-selection clause when it was in 
fine print on the back of ticket.215  Asserting that only the most meticulous 
and careful reader would find the forum-selection clause, Stevens 
emphasized the point by attaching a copy of the ticket in its original size to 
his dissent.216  He argued that even a careful reader would have little choice 
but to be by bound the forum-selection clause because the first opportunity 
to examine it did not occur until after the non-refundable ticket had already 
been purchased.217  Presented with a choice between risking suit in Florida 
and losing money by canceling the ticket, Stevens reasoned that most 
passengers would choose the former.218  Furthermore, he noted that the fact 
that the cruise line benefitted financially did not make the forum-selection 
clause reasonable.219 
Justice Stevens also contended that the Limitation of Vessel Owner’s 
Liability Act was violated by the use and enforcement of the forum-
selection clause.220  The doctrine prohibiting express exculpatory clauses 
also applied to restrictions that weakened the passenger’s opportunity for 
recovery, such as unreasonably short notice of claim periods and choice-of-
law clauses favorable to the defendant.221  In addition, Stevens noted two 
common law contract principles that authorized judicial scrutiny of the 
forum selection clause.222  First, the courts review adhesion contracts, 
where the offeror has stronger bargaining power, with heightened 
scrutiny.223  At common law, adhesion contracts are scrutinized for 
reasonableness.224  Second, contracts limiting the place or court where an 
 
 212. Id. at 596 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988)). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See generally id. at 597–605 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 215. Id. at 597. 
 216. Id.  The copy of the ticket can be found after the last page of the dissent.  
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 597–98. 
 220. Id. at 598. 
 221. Id. at 599. 
 222. Id. at 600–01. 
 223. Id. at 600. 
 224. Id. 
   
Spring 2011]   JUSTICE STEVENS’S JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE 463 
action may be brought are “invalid as contrary to public policy.”225   
Stevens insisted that “the prevailing rule is still that forum-selection clauses 
are not enforceable if they were not freely bargained for, create additional 
expense for one party, or deny one party a remedy.”226 
Although the Court relied on The Bremen to decide the case, Justice 
Stevens believed that the federal statute addressing measures to limit ship 
owner liability should control.227  Although § 183c did not mention forum 
selection clauses, the statutory language was “broad enough to encompass 
them,” according to Stevens.228  He quoted from the House Report 
accompanying the enactment of the statute in 1936, which indicated 
Congress’s intent to put a stop to ticketing practices such as arbitration 
clauses and “all such practices . . . of a like character.”229  This intent was 
reflected in the statutory language, which stated that it was unlawful to 
insert language into a contract that purported to “lessen, weaken, or avoid 
the right of any claimant to a trial . . . on the question of liability.”230  In the 
Shutes’ case, Stevens believed the clause weakened their ability to 
recover.231  The cruise originated and terminated in California, so 
jurisdiction in Washington would allow the Shutes to call witnesses with 
“less expense and inconvenience” than in Florida.232  Stevens further noted 
that “an analogous provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” had 
been construed by the circuit courts as invalidating forum-selection clauses 
that limited suits to a foreign jurisdiction.233  He reasoned that the same 
principle applied in this case, where the burden on the Shutes of litigating 
in Florida was proportional to the burden for corporations to litigate in a 
foreign jurisdiction.234 
 Justice Stevens’s common law approach to judging is reflected in his 
emphasis on the case law regulating adhesion contracts and his reliance on 
statutory authority rather than expanding the holding in The Bremen into a 
more general rule.  Stevens preferred to apply the statute written by 
legislators vested with the “[t]he primary responsibility for line-drawing”235 
rather than apply the rule from The Bremen.  This reliance on the statutes 
 
 225. Id. at 601 (Justice Stevens concluded that the forum-selection clause in this case 
would be unenforceable under common law before The Bremen and under the current 
prevailing rule). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 598.  See 46 U.S.C. § 183c. 
 228. Id. at 603. 
 229. Id. at 602 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 76-2517, at 6–7 (1936)). 
 230. Id. at 603 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988)). 
 231. Id.   
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 604. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408, 447 (1989). 
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was consistent with his policy of judicial restraint and deference to other 
legal decision-makers.  In addition, Stevens’s analysis of the specific facts 
of the case enabled him to arrive at a fair result based upon the positions of 
the parties.  
C. Burnham: Eschewing Constitutional Politics 
Burnham v. Superior Court236 differs from the preceding cases in at 
least two ways.  First, Burnham involved what is known as transient 
jurisdiction—the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a “nonresident” who 
is served with process while in the forum state “temporarily . . . in a suit 
unrelated to his activities in the State.”237  The case therefore did not 
squarely involve the exercise of specific jurisdiction (although, as noted 
below, Justice Brennan relied upon the notion of minimum contacts set out 
in International Shoe in his concurrence).  Second, in Burnham, the parties 
were individuals; in all of the preceding cases, at least one of the parties 
was a corporation and in every case except Burger King the defendant 
seeking to avoid the forum state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was a 
corporation.  In Justice Stevens’s view, Burnham was an easy case to 
decide.238  It nevertheless generated four different decisions.239  That is 
primarily because the principal dispute in the case did not concern the rules 
governing specific jurisdiction (as in Shaffer and Asahi) or the application 
of jurisdictional rules to the particular facts of the case (as in Burger King 
and Carnival Cruise).  Instead the principal dispute was one of 
constitutional interpretation, with the familiar clash between Justice 
Brennan’s belief in the evolving Constitution and Justice Scalia’s 
competing adherence to Originalism taking center stage.  Because he did 
not believe it was necessary to address this debate to decide the case, 
Stevens did not side with either Justice.240  As in Shaffer, he wrote a 
separate concurrence that prevented any decision from commanding more 
than four votes.241 
Burnham addressed the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction.  The 
Burnhams had been married for eleven years and had two children when 
they decided to separate in July 1987.242  They agreed that Mrs. Burnham 
would move to California with their children and Mr. Burnham would 
remain in New Jersey.243  Before Mrs. Burnham left for California, she and 
Mr. Burnham also agreed that she would file for divorce on grounds of 
 
 236. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 237. Id. at 607.   
 238. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 239. Id. at 604, 628, 640. 
 240. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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“irreconcilable differences.”244  Despite the agreement to part amicably, in 
October 1987, Mr. Burnham “filed for divorce in New Jersey state court on 
grounds of ‘desertion.’”245  However, he did not “obtain an issuance of 
summons against his wife and did not attempt to serve her with process.”246  
Mrs. Burnham then “brought suit for divorce in California state court in 
early January 1988” when it became clear that Mr. Burnham did not plan to 
honor their prior agreement.247 
In late January, Mr. Burnham traveled to California on business and 
visited his children at Mrs. Burnham’s home in the San Francisco Bay 
area.248  While there, he “was served with a California court summons and 
a copy of Mrs. Burnham’s divorce petition” during the visit and then 
returned to New Jersey.249  Mr. Burnham sought to quash service of process 
on the grounds that there was no personal jurisdiction over him in 
California, but none of the state courts granted him relief.250 
He then petitioned the United States Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari.251  The Court unanimously affirmed the decision below, but none 
of the four separate opinions or any of their parts constituted a majority of 
the Court.  Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and 
delivered an opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy.252  Justice 
White joined Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C and also filed an opinion 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.253  Justice Brennan filed 
an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun and O’Connor,254 and Justice Stevens filed an opinion 
concurring only in the judgment.255 
In Parts II-A and II-B, Justice Scalia, adopting the Originalist 
approach, traced the roots of personal jurisdiction and concluded that 
transient jurisdiction was deeply embedded in “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”256  Citing extensively to early American cases, 
English common law, treatises, and restatements,257 he explained that 
assertion of state jurisdiction over a non-resident present in that state was 
 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 607–08. 
 248. Id. at 608. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id.; 493 U.S. 807 (1989). 
 252. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607. 
 253. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 254. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 255. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 256. Id. at 609 (plurality opinion) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945)). 
 257. See generally id. at 608–23. 
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common practice when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 
and continued until the present.  Transient jurisdiction therefore comported 
with due process as contemplated by the authors of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.258 
Although Justice Scalia acknowledged that the precedents including 
International Shoe and Shaffer established the “minimum contacts” 
analysis and “weaken[ed]” the Pennoyer rule requiring personal service, he 
distinguished those cases from Burnham by pointing out that they dealt 
with absent defendants as opposed to those present in the state and 
personally served.259  He further stated that this analysis was developed by 
analogy to territorial jurisdiction and applied to “novel, non-traditional 
assertions of jurisdiction” where non-resident defendants who were not 
personally served in the state may nonetheless be subject to jurisdiction 
based on their contacts with the state and the relatedness of those contacts 
to the litigation.260  In Scalia’s view, neither case stood for the proposition 
that all bases of personal jurisdiction must conform to the International 
Shoe standard.261  Ultimately, Justice Scalia concluded that California’s 
jurisdiction over Burnham was constitutional “[b]ecause the Due Process 
Clause [did] not prohibit the California courts from exercising jurisdiction 
over petitioner based on the fact of in-state service of process.”262 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence advocated the “minimum contacts” 
analysis and focused on the fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction in 
the forum state.263  Although he agreed that “historical pedigree” was 
relevant to fair notice, he asserted that International Shoe and Shaffer 
required the Court to abandon earlier rules based on “legal fictions” 
generated by such cases as Harris v. Balk and Pennoyer.264  Because Mr. 
Burnham was voluntarily present in California, Justice Brennan concluded 
that he had sufficient contacts such that jurisdiction was not 
unreasonable.265  Furthermore, Burnham enjoyed the state’s protection, 
infrastructure, services, access to courts, and economic advantages during 
his three-day visit, and therefore he “availed himself of its benefits” so that 
he could anticipate being called to defend himself there.266  Brennan also 
considered the burdens on Burnham of litigating in the state and concluded 
 
 258. Id. at 611, 615. 
 259. See generally id. at 616–22. 
 260. Id. at 619. 
 261. Id. at 619–21. 
 262. Id. at 628. 
 263. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 264. Id. at 629–30; see also Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714 (1878). 
 265. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 635–37(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 266. Id. at 637–38. 
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that they were not prohibitive and could be ameliorated through various 
procedures.267 
Justices Scalia and Brennan devoted many footnotes and more than a 
“few words”268 to refuting the merits of the other’s jurisprudential 
methodology.  In what Justice Stevens characterized as “a very easy case” 
to decide,269 the Justices nevertheless engaged in a lengthy debate over the 
appropriate approach to constitutional interpretation of due process and the 
lawmaking role of the Court generally.  Justice Scalia emphasized the 
primacy of the intent and understanding of the framers270 and the role of the 
people through their states in the evolution of law.271  Justice Brennan 
emphasized the importance of contemporary societal norms and modern 
justifications for legal rules272 and noted the need for the Court to check the 
states’ potentially unfair expansion of jurisdiction.273 
Although Burnham was a procedural due process case, scholars have 
speculated that the divisions in the Burnham decision reflected the larger 
fundamental disagreement over the Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence.274  At the time Burnham was decided, the Court was deeply 
 
 267. Id. at 638–39.  Justice Brennan elaborated:   
For example, in the federal system, a transient defendant can avoid protracted 
litigation of a spurious suit through a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
or though a motion for summary judgment. . . .  He can use relatively inexpensive 
methods of discovery . . . .  Moreover, a change of venue may be possible. . . .  In 
state court, many of the same procedural protections are available, as is the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, under which the suit may be dismissed.   
Id. at 639 n.13 (citations omitted).   
 268. Id. at 622 (plurality opinion). 
 269. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 270. Id. at 610–11, 622 (plurality opinion).  
 271. Id. at 621–22, 627. 
 272. Id. at 630–31 & n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 273. Id. at 639 n.14. 
 274. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Personal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Theory—A 
Comment on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 689, 698–99 (1991) (noting that 
“[u]ltimately the Scalia/Brennan dispute in Burnham reflects a fundamental difference of 
opinion on the virtues of an unconstrained judiciary” with respect to whether “the judiciary 
is the appropriate body to make fundamental moral judgments on issues ranging from 
abortion and sex discrimination to affirmative action and rent control”); Paul C. Wilson, A 
Pedigree for Due Process?, 56 MO. L. REV. 353, 367, 385 (1991) (noting that “[t]he split 
revealed by the two principal opinions . . . strikes to the heart of due process analysis” and 
discussing the same split in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), where Justice 
Scalia relied on the tradition-based analysis to reject the construction of a substantive due 
process right); see also R. George Wright, Two Models of Constitutional Adjudication, 40 
AM. U. L. REV. 1357, 1361 n.22 (1991) (noting that the Burnham opinions develop the pre-
existing debate concerning the merits of a tradition-based analysis); Daniel A. Farber, Legal 
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1349 (1988) (observing that 
“much of the contemporary debate about the foundations of constitutional law is really a 
debate about Roe v. Wade and the related line of privacy cases”) (footnote omitted). 
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divided over the right to abortion established in Roe v. Wade;275 Burnham 
was decided after Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,276 in which the 
prospect of overruling Roe was openly debated. 
In his four lines and single footnote,  Stevens avoided this debate and 
chastised his colleagues for engaging in it.277  Referring to his separate 
opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner,278 Stevens explained that he did not join the 
Court’s decision because he was uneasy with the unnecessarily broad reach 
of that opinion.279  He asserted that the same broad reach was present in the 
decisions of Scalia and Brennan and therefore refused to join either.280  
Stevens concluded that Burnham was a simple case as demonstrated by the 
“historical evidence and consensus identified” by Justice Scalia, the 
“considerations of fairness” articulated by Justice Brennan, and the 
“common sense” shown by Justice White.281  Finally, as in Asahi, Stevens’s 
decision to concur separately and not to join any other decision prevented 
Scalia or Brennan from securing five votes and establishing the controlling 
legal rule. 
CONCLUSION 
It is no coincidence that Justice Stevens may have been the nation’s 
last common law Justice.  He was nominated by President Gerald Ford 
because Ford sought to nominate a well-qualified lawyer rather than 
promote a particular judicial philosophy.282  And as was observed after his 
retirement announcement, Stevens was the last Justice from the era that 
preceded the political-litmus tests and intense ideological scrutiny of 
Supreme Court nominees that began under President Ronald Reagan and 
have only intensified since then. 
This Article has explored Stevens’s common law approach to the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine during the period when the Court sought to 
 
 275. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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 278. 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977). 
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 281. Id.  See also id. at 649 n.* (“Perhaps the adage about hard cases making bad law 
should be revised to cover easy cases.”).  In his concurrence, Justice White stated that “[t]he 
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 282. See Adam Liptak, From Age of Independence to the Age of Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, 
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develop a more comprehensive and general framework for the doctrine.  
The Court succeeded only somewhat in its efforts.  Shaffer substantially 
restricted quasi in rem jurisdiction and held that assertions of personal 
jurisdiction based on property should be evaluated according to the 
minimum contacts approach set out in International Shoe.  Furthermore, 
the Court expanded the reach of personal jurisdiction in both Burger 
King—holding that Rudzewicz, a Michigan resident who was responsible 
for operating a local restaurant, could be haled into a Florida court based 
upon his contractual dealings with a Florida corporation—and Carnival 
Cruise—enforcing the forum-selection clause despite the Schutes’ claim 
that application of the clause was unfair to them.  However, the Court in 
Asahi was unable to articulate a more specific rule in stream-of-commerce 
cases and in Burnham could not agree on the reason why the Due Process 
Clause was not violated by in-state service of an individual defendant in the 
forum state.  The more enduring lesson from the Court’s often splintered 
decisions is that evaluating the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a 
particular case continues to be, as Professor Hazard wrote, a process of 
“arbitrary particularization.”283  For about two decades after Carnival 
Cruise, the Supreme Court deferred to the federal courts of appeals on 
personal jurisdiction, allowing those courts to develop the specific rules for 
their own jurisdictions. 
Although Justice Stevens did not write the majority decision in any of 
the cases discussed above, his jurisprudential approach—with its emphasis 
on deciding cases narrowly with close attention to the facts of the particular 
case, rather than articulating general rules—seems to have prevailed.  
Despite—or more likely because of—his refusal to provide a fifth vote to 
any opinion in Asahi or Burnham, the Supreme Court did not revisit the 
doctrinal disputes at issue in those cases until after Stevens retired.  In June 
2011, the Supreme Court revisited stream-of-commerce doctrine in 
McIntyre—and splintered again.  Indeed, McIntyre raises more questions 
than it answers.  Justice Kennedy’s plurality decision retreats to the past. 
Not only did he embrace Justice O’Connor’s “stream of commerce plus” 
approach in Asahi, he also revived notions of consent and state sovereignty 
that the Court seemed to have abandoned no later than Insurance 
Corporation of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.284  In his 
concurrence, Justice Breyer decided the case narrowly, insisting that 
McIntyre did not involve any of the “many recent changes in commerce 
and communication . . . not anticipated by our precedents” and that the case 
 
 283. Hazard, supra note 21. 
 284. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 
2790 (2011) (approving “Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi”).  See also id. at 2787 (“A 
person may submit to a State’s authority in a number of ways” including “explicit consent”) 
(citing Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)), 
2789 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum analysis”).   
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could be decided based upon existing case law.285  He seemed to gaze 
forward, with his eyes on the next case to update legal rules governing 
personal jurisdiction.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is rooted in the present, 
canvassing the record and arguing that through the use of an exclusive 
distributor—“common in today’s commercial world”—the British 
manufacturer had purposefully availed itself of New Jersey.286  It is for the 
Court to attempt, again, to articulate a single rule for stream-of-commerce 
jurisdiction.  However, given the divergent approaches in McIntyre, the 
prospect of a uniform rule seems more elusive than ever.  The only point of 
agreement among the three decisions seems to be that personal jurisdiction 
is a highly fact-specific doctrine.287 
McIntyre also confirms the wisdom of Justice Stevens’s common law 
approach to personal jurisdiction.  Stevens’s decisions in the cases 
discussed in this Article are more persuasive because they are more 
nuanced and more sensitive to the significance of the particular facts of 
case.  Professor Hazard’s insight about the “arbitrary particularization” that 
is inherent in evaluating a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction endures 
because it reflects the importance of the particular facts of a case to 
resolving any specific personal jurisdiction dispute.   
It may be argued that Justice Stevens’s narrow decisions prevented the 
Supreme Court from developing a more general and uniform set of 
personal jurisdiction rules and thereby perpetuated the arbitrary 
particularization noted by Professor Hazard.  And it may be further argued 
that the common law approach to judging generally is not appropriate for a 
Supreme Court Justice.  Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that the 
Court, which hears relatively few cases given the thousands of certiorari 
petitions filed each term, should decide cases according to clear, general 
rules that are in accord with the intentions of the framers of the 
Constitution.288  In Scalia’s view, a rule-based approach provides valuable 
guidance to lower courts and prevents cases from being decided on fact-
 
 285. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 2792 (discussing World-Wide 
Volkswagen and Asahi, stating that “[n]one of our precedents finds [sic] that a single 
isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort here, is sufficient” for New 
Jersey to establish jurisdiction over British manufacturer).   
 286. Id. at 2795–97, 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
 287. See id. at 2790 (noting that even with the application of Justice O’Connor’s 
approach in Asahi, there still will be “many difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise 
in particular cases,” the “defendant’s conduct and the economic realities of the market the 
defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases,” and “judicial exposition will, in common 
law fashion, clarify the contours of that principle”); id. at 2792–93 (deciding case narrowly 
“on the record present here” and “refusing to go further”) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 
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claim”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
 288. Scalia, supra note 11. 
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based fairness grounds that may appear to be somewhat arbitrary.  
Stevens’s response is that the Supreme Court and the nation are best served 
by narrow decisions that acknowledge the Court’s institutional limits and 
are grounded in the facts of the particular case.  Like society, the law 
evolves.  Indeed, as Stevens has written, “the vast open spaces in the text” 
of the Constitution “indicate that its authors implicitly delegated the power 
to fill those spaces to future generations of lawmakers.”289  By deciding 
cases in the manner of a common law judge, Stevens allowed for other 
legal actors to play an active and appropriate role in the legal process. 
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